The purported failure of the classical quantity theory of money in the colonial economy is shown to be a failure of data and not a failure of theory. When new data on the quantity of specie in circulation is added to the current data on paper money and prices, and econometrically estimated in both shortand long-run monetary models, the long-debated anomaly regarding the performance of the classical quantity theory of money in the colonial economy disappears.
1723, until 1775, inflation and the issue of paper money seems to be unrelated. One can place great confidence in these results since the price data for Philadelphia are very good." 2 [Place Table 1 Here] Using the same model and data, West's (1978) results for Pennsylvania were replicated in Table 1 -Section I, Part B. While the results differ from those originally reported by West, they do not differ enough to necessarily overturn his conclusion. 3 Next, West's model is reestimated using MT in place of Mp, see Table 1 -Section II. Slightly different years must be used because Ms, and hence MT, is only known for 1729 through 1775. This difference does not affect the results. Compared with the results using only Mp, the relationship between PI and MT is substantially improved, i.e., substantially higher R 2 s and statistical significance on the money coefficients. While these results are not overwhelming, they are still strong given that this model is a short-run test of a long-run proposition. No one claims that ln(Y) and ln(V) are universal constants with no short-run cyclical movements, i.e., no one claims that b must equal 1 for the classical version of the quantity theory of money to hold (Friedman 1956; Lucas 1980 Lucas , p. 1007 ).
If West had reported the results using MT in Table 1 -Section II, it is likely that the subsequent debate between the "quantity" and the "backing" theorists over colonial monetary performance would never have occurred.
LONG-RUN TESTS OF THE QUANTITY THEORY OF MONEY
The West (1978) model is an improper test of the classical quantity theory of money because it is a short-run model (Friedman 1956; Lucas 1980 Lucas , p. 1007 McCallum 1992, p. 157) .
The classical assumptions that per capita ln(Y) and ln(V) are long-run constants implies that money demand or per capita total real money balances (m = ln[MT/(P*Pop)] where P is the price level and Pop is population) is stable over the long-run, but not necessarily in the short-run. Per capita real money balances from 1729 through 1775 for Pennsylvania are displayed in Figure 1 .
Using these data, the following regression shows that m has no linear trend. Over the long run, total real money balances grew at the rate of population. 
ASSESSING THE MECHANISMS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

A. The "Quantity" Theorists' Model of the Monetary Adjustment Mechanism
The "quantity" theorists (McCallum 1992; Michener 1987 Michener , 1988 ) offer a model of the monetary adjustment mechanism in the colonial economy that assumes that Mp and Ms are instantaneously perfect substitutes at a perfectly defended and forecastable fixed exchange rate with zero transactions costs. As long as increases in Mp are not so large that they totally drive Ms out of the colony, changes in Mp would be perfectly off-set by opposite flows (imports and exports) of Ms leaving MT unchanged. Thus, even large changes in Mp can be unrelated to PI because MT per capita remains constant. As such, West (1978) style findings that show no relationship between PI and Mp support rather than violate the classical quantity theory of money. Only when increases in Mp have totally driven all Ms out of the colony would further increases in Mp produce increases in PI. These scholars claim to have saved, at least theoretically, the classical quantity theory of money from the challenges put forward by the "backing" theorists and by the West (1978) style findings. However, they have saved it by rendering it useless as an empirical tool for colony-specific or even regionally-specific monetary analysis-for in their model only the global money supply matters.
The institutional setting needed to support the required action in this model, however, is absent. How the model's assumed fixed exchange rate between Mp and Ms was defended remains a mystery (Smith 1988) . While colonial governments accepted specie and their own paper money in payment of the taxes they levied at an established rate, what made this rate, which could be altered at any time by the legislature, equivalent to a perfectly defended fixed exchange rate regime is unclear. Colonial legislatures did not and could not engage in monetary micro-management in the very short-run (certainly not like modern central banks). They never entered the market to buy and sell their paper money for specie neither to affect nor in reaction to exchange rate movements. And to assume that such a fixed exchange rate regime was perfectly defended by custom or by a conspiracy of myopic merchant-arbitragers stretches credulity. 6 The fixed exchange rate assumption of the quantity theorists is also hard to square with the available data on exchange rates (McCusker 1978) . These data are based on the rates stated in a large sample of merchant account books between pounds sterling and each colony's paper money. It reveals considerable variation in each colony's rate over time. The monthly data from 6 1740 through 1775 for Pennsylvania are probably the best in terms of frequency, density, and quality of observations (McCusker 1978, pp. 185-88) . For the 432 months over these 36 years, data for only 34 months is missing, and the missing observations are widely scattered. These data reveal that in only 11% of the possible paired comparisons were the exchange rates in a given month the same as in the subsequent month. And in only 4% of the possible paired comparisons were the exchange rates in a given month the same as in the same month in the subsequent year. Clearly, the exchange rate was not fixed. Grubb (2003 Grubb ( , p. 1786 , however, shows that despite this volatility, several colonies experienced periods of long-run stability in their exchange rates in terms of statistically insignificant linear trends and statistical rejection of non-stationarity. But just as periods of constant prices do not imply price controls, periods of relative stability in exchange rates do not imply a fixed exchange-rate regime. The long-run stability of these exchange rates can be easily accounted for by the lack of trend in, and by the stationary behavior of, per capita real money balances (see the prior section). The quantity theorists have simply confused exchange-rate stability for exchange-rate fixedness.
Finally, the predictions of the quantity theorists' model of the monetary adjustment mechanism have not, to date, been tested because evidence on the yearly amount of Ms in circulation has been lacking. These predictions are that Mp and Ms per capita are perfectly negatively correlated, and that Ms must dwarf Mp, i.e., Ms/Mp > 1, by a substantial margin for PI to remain unrelated to Mp given the observed large movements in Mp. With the new data series on Ms for Pennsylvania (Grubb 2004) both these implications can now be tested and, when tested, they both fail. First, Ms never exceeds Mp in any year in the sample (see the data in the Appendix- Table A) . Second, over time Mp and Ms are far from automatically off setting (see Figure 1 and the data in the Appendix- The problem with the quantity theorists' model of the monetary adjustment mechanism is that it constrains the classical version of the quantity theory of money to hold perfectly in the short-run, something it was never intended to do. As such, the model falls victim to the actual course of events. The history of the colonial economy reveals frequent, and sometimes massive, short-run off-trend shocks connected to wars, political trade disruptions, and so forth. For example, the Seven Year's War occasioned both a massive increase in Mp by colonial legislatures and a large inflow of Ms occasioned by British military spending, see Figure 1 above. The colonial response to the British credit crisis of 1772 (legislative increases in Mp), and to British efforts to impose imperial taxes and close Boston harbor (boycotting the import of British goods thus reducing the re-export of Ms out of the colonies) had a similar result. It led to simultaneous increases in Mp and Ms. While the econometric exercises in the prior sections show that the classical version of quantity theory of money performs well in the colonial economy, substantial short-run off-trend shocks clearly occurred.
In conclusion, the currency-substitution claims made by the quantity theorists are too simplistic to account for the empirical evidence. The same evidence shows both that the classical quantity theory of money performs well, and that the quantity theorists' model of the monetary adjustment mechanism fails. Therefore, the quantity theorists' model of the monetary adjustment mechanism is not needed to save the classical quantity theory of money in the colonial economy.
B. The "Backing" Theorists' Model of the Monetary Adjustment Mechanism
The "backing" theorists' (Calomiris 1988a (Calomiris , 1988b Smith 1985a Smith , 1985b Smith , 1988 Wicker 1985) model of the colonial monetary adjustment mechanism makes V a direct negative function of Mp. As such, increases in Mp can be perfectly offset by reductions in V, and vice versa, so that PI remains unrelated to changes in Mp. This assumption contrasts sharply with the classical quantity theory of money that assumes that V is not a direct function of MT in either the short or long run. At best, V might be an indirect function of MT, but only in the short-run through MT's transitional or cyclical effect on P and interest rates (Cagan 1956 , Fisher 1912 , Friedman 1956 .
Given that the econometric exercises in the prior sections show that the classical quantity theory of money performs well in the colonial economy, especially in the long-run where ln(V) is assumed to be a constant, the backing theorists' model of the monetary adjustment mechanism is only relevant for explaining off-trend or short-run cyclical movements.
On some margins the institutional setting needed to support the required action in this model is present, while on other margins it is not. For example, the institutional setting for the injection and removal of Mp is consistent with backing theory. Colonial governments issued Mp in conjunction with specific taxes designed to redeem said Mp at future established dates, or as loans to subjects who pledged their land as collateral and adhered to specific repayment schedules (Behrens 1923 , Brock 1975 , Wicker 1985 . Colonists could have forecast whether these future conditions were likely to be fulfilled. By institutionally linking current monetary action with future monetary action, and assuming that colonists could fully anticipate both current and future monetary actions, colonists could engage in inter-temporal shifts in savings and consumption that would fully undo current monetary action (Barro 1977, Sargent and Wallace 1981) . One avenue of response would be for colonists to increase their cash holdings (decreasing V) when a colony increased its Mp in anticipation of paying the future taxes and mortgage payments that were directly tied to that current increase in Mp. Another avenue of response would be for colonists to increase their cash holdings (decreasing V) when a colony increased its Mp in anticipation of lower future prices produced by the required future reduction (redemption) of said Mp. This action would in turn prevent the current increase in Mp from pushing up current prices. Thus, unlike the 19th and early 20th centuries, the colonial institutional setting may have caused V to be a direct negative function of Mp. 8 On the other hand, whether Mp served as a vehicle for inter-temporal shifts in savings and consumption in the colonial economy is doubtful. For large changes in Mp to be completely absorbed by changes in V implies large changes in the holding of real cash balances. Because government bonds and deposit banking do not exit in the colonial economy, this possibility relies on the personal possession of cash being an important asset or store of value rather than just a medium of exchange (Laidler 1987, Sargent and Wallace 1981) . However, evidence from probate inventories shows that possession of cash comprised only 2.4% of total net worth (Jones 1980, pp. 128-29) . The vast majority of wealth was held as land, and the vast majority of financial assets were held in non-marketable debt claims. Cash served principally as a medium of exchange and not as a store of value. The circulation of Mp was so frequent that Pennsylvania's legislature had to pass, and often renew, an act authorizing the exchange "torn and ragged" bills for new bills (Statutes at Large, vol. 4, pp. 203, 414; vol. 5, pp. 48, 60, 192; vol. 7, p. 204) . The prerequisite of substantial personal asset-holdings of cash needed for the backing theory's monetary mechanism to work does not appear to have been met by the colonial economy.
In addition, whether current and future monetary actions could be fully anticipated by colonists is doubtful. The assumption that colonists could fully anticipate monetary actions is necessary to eliminate the possibility that money is non-neutral in the short run (Barro 1977) . If money is neutral in the short run, then changes in MT can only change P or V in the short run.
The institutional setting in the backing theory eliminates P, thus leaving only V to change in the short run. However, if colonists could not fully anticipate monetary actions, then the nonneutrality of money in the short run is restored. In 1764 Benjamin Franklin observed that injections of paper money "gave new life to business" and "promoted greatly the settlement of new land" (Nussbaum 1957, p. 27) . This raises the possibility that changes in MT caused shortrun changes in Y rather than V, a possibility that backing theory can only eliminate in the colonial economy by assumption.
Colonial legislatures engaged in substantive monetary actions in response to large crises, such as wars, depression, and trade shocks (Brock 1975, pp. 74-84, 353-91; Lester 1938;  Pennsylvania Archives; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania). Wars and trade shocks were known to be likely near-term events, though exactly when they would occur was not easy to anticipate.
They were certainly unforecastable five years out. Once a crisis was upon a colony, anticipating the course of monetary injections was also difficult. For example, during the Seven Year's War, while colonial legislatures typically authorized the issuance of a given sum of Mp, the actual injection of money into the economy to pay soldiers, etc. occurred as needed (Appendix -Table   B ). In addition, because the timing of future new injections of Mp were not contingent on present monetary actions, the exact time-path of future MT, despite the required redemption of current Mp injections, could not be fully anticipated. Finally, because these monetary injections were typically government spending-money put in the hands of soldiers who were non-saversshort-run changes in Y would seem likely. (Smith 1985a (Smith , 1988 Wicker 1985) . Between 1754 and 1759, total real cash balances per capita in Pennsylvania, for example, increased by 147% (see Figure 1 and Appendix- Table A) . On the surface, the possibility that per capita Y could increase by 147% over a five-year period seems highly improbable. Thus, by deduction, V must have decreased by a substantial percentage. This reasoning, however, fails to appreciate the colossal and unprecedented effect the Seven Year's War had on real aggregates as well as on monetary aggregates. For example, between 1754 and 1759, the value of British exports to the Thirteen Colonies increased by 69%, and the value of British export to, minus imports from, the Thirteen Colonies increased by an overwhelming 232% (derived from Egnal 1998, p. 35; Mitchell and Deane 1962, p. 310) . The colonies experienced a massive influx and net retention of goods during these five years. The first half of the Seven Year's War, therefore, occasioned both an unprecedented increase in [ln(MT/P)] and an unprecedented increase in ln(Y) of potentially similar magnitudes. Finally, as the War ended and [ln(MT/P)] declined precipitously (see Figure 1 ), Y also declined to depression levels (Egnal 1998, pp. 42-117; Doerflinger 1986, pp. 173-78; McCusker and Menard 1985, p. 63) . This movement in Y could have left little room for the changes in V required by backing theory.
Likewise, substantial short-run cyclical changes in Y occurred during the Revolutionary War (Buel 1998 , Doerflinger 1986 , O'Shaughnessy 2000 , which makes assessing backing theory outcomes during the Revolution (Calomiris 1988a) problematic.
In conclusion, if monetary shocks were largely reflected through Y in the short run and total real money balances per capita remained constant in the long run, then we are back in a classical quantity theory of money world. Until more is known about the exact magnitudes of year-to-year changes in Y and V, the backing theory's mechanism of monetary adjustment as applied to the colonial economy must remain speculative.
SMITH'S DIRECT ECONOMETRIC TEST OF BACKING VERSUS QUANTITY
Maryland's paper money emission and method of backing for the years 1733 through 1764 were unique. In 1733 Maryland authorized the issuance of 90,000 Maryland pounds in bills of credit (paper money). The quantity of bills in circulation at any one time was less than this authorized sum by varying amounts, see Appendix- Table B . While other colonies backed their paper money with future taxes and land mortgages, Maryland's bills were backed through the creation of a sinking fund. The money for this fund came from the proceeds of a 15 pence tax on every hogshead of tobacco exported from the colony, and was used to purchase Bank of England stock. This fund was to be used to redeem the bills in two stages, in each case by converting a sufficient amount of the sinking fund into sterling bills of exchange and exchanging them for Maryland pounds at a rate of three pounds sterling for every four Maryland pounds. This rate was considered the par exchange rate between sterling and Maryland currency. One-third of the bills were to be redeemed in 1748. The two-thirds not redeemed in 1748 were to be exchanged at that date for new bills that were then to be redeemed in 1764 in the same fashion as in 1748.
Maryland's sinking fund provides a yearly measure of the current value of what backed Maryland's paper money (Behrens 1923, pp. 12-49; Brock 1975, pp. 99-105, 412-28; Price 1977) . 9 Smith (1985b, pp. 1200-08) used the unique features of Maryland's monetary system to craft a direct econometric test between the quantity of paper money and the backing of paper money to see which played a greater role in determining the value of paper money. Smith's test is the only econometric and statistical exercise published after West (1978) Table 2 -Section I, Part A. Based on these results, Smith (1985b Smith ( , pp. 1207 concluded that "Clearly the quantity of money alone has no impact on currency [Place Table 2 Here] First, Smith's results are replicated, using his data and model, to make sure that the subsequent analysis starts from the same point and the subsequent differences in results are purely a product of the changes described. Figure 1 ).
Maryland's fulfillment of its redemption commitment in 1748 had no effect on the exchange rate distinguishable from any number of other events occurring in the five years on either side of 1748. Therefore, this measure of backing can be discarded. It lacks statistical and interpretive relevance. Table   B ). In the years before 1756, Smith filled in missing observations with the immediately prior observation, and filled in missing observations after 1755 by substituting the authorized amount for the amount actually in circulation. Smith neither indicated that his data were highly interpolated nor offered any justification for his peculiar method of data interpolation. Based on the discussions in the original source (Brock 1975, pp. 104, 418-19) MMSp a statistically significant relationship between the quantity of money and Par appears, see (1764) ]. A measure of the degree of backing credibility that would capture this expectation would be the deviation from the expected trend accumulation needed to just meet the promised redemption. The greater the sinking fund's deviation below this trend, the greater the expectation that Maryland would be forced to shift its backing regime, i.e., forced to redeem its paper money in 1764 at less than the promised three pounds sterling for every four Maryland pounds.
Several such measures were tried, but because all yielded the same result only one is reported, see Table 2 -Section II, Part B. This measure [Forecasted Backing] equals the percentage the actual sinking fund at a given date fell below the linear accumulation rate needed to just fulfill the promised redemption in 1764. If Maryland were on this linear accumulation rate, they would also be able to fulfill their redemption promise of 1748. This measure assumes that subjects knew how many of the bills authorized in 1733 the colony would eventually put into circulation. It also assumes that they knew that per-year tobacco exports, and so the tax revenue put into the sinking fund each year, would experience zero growth in the long run, and that the fund's stock dividends would largely be offset by commission fees. 12 Thus, a linear accumulation rate in the sinking fund between 1733 and 1764 geared to meet the promised redemption of the actual sum to be redeemed in 1764 would correspond to perfect backing.
The sinking fund was substantially below this "perfect backing" trend accumulation in most years. For example, the fund was 50 percent below this trend accumulation in 1744 and again in 1758. Only in 1749, was it above and only after 1762 was it only 5 percent or less below, this trend accumulation. Maryland actually redeemed its paper currency as promised in 1748 and 1764. They were able to do so because the sinking fund experienced exceptional growth in the years immediately prior to these redemption dates. Therefore, backing, as defined by the forecasting of the likely backing regime shift, appears to be of little importance to determining the value of money in Maryland between 1733 and 1764.
Finally, when this model, or any model in Table 2 , is AR1 corrected for serial correlation, statistically significant results on both the money and the backing variables disappear. As such, the data for Maryland may not be strong enough to tell us anything about backing versus the quantity of money.
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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
In the literature on colonial monetary behavior what theoretically differentiates the role of backing from that of the quantity of money has not been well articulated. Fiat paper money, by definition, assumes some type of backing in order to hold its value above its opportunity value. Scarcity of paper alone cannot do it. If scarcity alone determined a money's value, then it would be a commodity money not a fiat money. Someone, typically the government, must be willing to accept fiat paper money for some commodity, service, or (tax) obligation at a rate above its opportunity value, such as above paper money's value as a bookmark or a fire-lighter.
At this level of analysis, there is no "quantity of money" versus "backing of money" dichotomy.
Even Fisher's (1912) world of the classical quantity theory of money assumes that banknotes were convertible on demand into gold. Likewise, the "quantity" theorists' monetary adjustment mechanism for the colonial economy discussed above assumes backing, namely, that someone was willing to exchange fiat paper money for specie at a fixed rate. In other words, the quantity theory of (fiat) money assumes a backing regime.
How backing affects nominal values is presented in two ways. First, for a given quantity of fiat money, a change in how money is backed, i.e., a sudden regime shift might alter the value of the fiat money (Sargent 1982) . It might also change the responsiveness of P, Y, and V to changes in MT through altering the degree by which future MT can be anticipated. Second, a particular backing regime might dissolve the long-run money-price connection by substituting a long-run money-velocity connection in its place (Calomiris 1988a; Laidler 1987; Sargent and Wallace 1981; Smith 1985a Smith , 1985b Smith , 1988 Wicker 1985) . These two ways tend to be conflated in the literature on colonial monetary behavior-for an example, see the analysis of Smith (1985b) in the prior section.
The first way is least controversial because it does not directly challenge the classical quantity theory of money. While the evidence for colonial America is not strong enough to support systematic econometric testing, it is highly suggestive that when colonial legislatures substantially changed their paper money backing regimes, holding the quantity of paper money constant, nominal values changed in the expected direction. For example, Smith (1985a, p. 552; 1985b , pp. 1189 , 1197 In some cases they switched between the policy of taxing the money out of circulation and physically burning it, and the policy of rolling-over issues of paper money as they where paid in as taxes (Brock 1975, pp. 33-34, 112-13, 120-23; Ernst 1973, pp. 63-75; Perkins 1991, p. 15 ).
One of the clearest demonstrations of this backing regime-shift effect is for Maryland in 1781. Maryland issued three distinguishable types of paper money, namely, "red" money, "black" money, and "state continental" money in 1780-81. The three monies were backed differently, some by future taxes and some by the expected sale of confiscated loyalist property, and they also traded at differing discounts off their face value. Since, by definition, the total quantity of money (all monies) in Maryland was the same relative to red, black, and state continental money at any point in time, it is differential backing that likely produced their differential discounts (Behrens 1923, pp. 69-77) .
Most of the backing literature for colonial America, however, does not focus on regime shifts, but examines the purported absence of a money-price relationship while holding a particular backing regime constant (Smith 1985a (Smith , 1985b (Smith , 1988 Wicker 1985) . Most of the colonies and periods examined, such as those of Pennsylvania and Maryland above, had constant de facto backing regimes through out. 14 As such, this second way of interpreting how backing affected nominal values is more controversial. By stressing that it is the particular regime, and not the shift in that regime, that matters, it directly challenges the classical quantity theory of money by substituting a long-run money-velocity relationship for the classical quantity theory of money's long-run money-price relationship (Laidler 1987, Sargent and Wallace 1981) .
The problem with the above approach to backing is that colonial backing regimes served two functions concurrently. They served a backing function by holding the value of paper money above its opportunity value through paper money's acceptance for tax obligations, and a quantity function by influencing the quantity of money through the time-path of note redemption. Based on this discussion and using the evidence for Pennsylvania in Figure 1 , an alternative monetary adjustment mechanism will be offered that combines the backing and quantity mechanisms. The Pennsylvania legislature could not engage in monetary micro-management in the very short run.
They also could not defend an exchange rate between paper money and specie in the short run.
However, they could and did engage in monetary actions in response to large crises, such as wars, depressions, and trade shocks (Brock 1975, pp. 74-84, 353-91; Lester 1938; Pennsylvania Archives; Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania). For example, see Pennsylvania's response to the Seven Year's War (Wicker 1985) and to the 1772 British Credit Crisis (Neal 1990, pp. 170-71; Sheridan 1960 ) illustrated in Figure 1 . Wars and trade shocks were known to be likely near-term events, though exactly when they would occur was not easily anticipated. The Pennsylvania legislature wanted to have a short-run monetary policy to finance wars, and to counter depressions by stimulating Y, but also wanted a credible long-run price-stability policy. To accomplish this dual policy, they had to convince their subjects that non-crisis monetary policy would undo the unanticipated crisis-year monetary injections such that per capita real cash balances would remain constant in the long run. They accomplished this through explicitly tying crisis-year monetary injections to taxes and mortgage payments that would be paid in the nearfuture non-crisis years. While designed to remove from circulation the prior monetary injection, the exact time-path of said removal was hard to forecast. The legislature maintained the credibility of this commitment by letting real cash balances decline during non-crisis periods, some of which could be quite lengthy, e.g., see 1733-41, 1748-54, and 1762-72 in Figure 1 .
The particular backing regimes used in colonial America were designed to control the quantity of money in the long run, and to provide credibility to this long-run commitment in the face of unanticipated short-run deviations during crisis periods. The backing of paper money and the quantity of paper money cannot be regarded as independent theories here. They are inseparable elements of a given institutional setting that attempted to control the quantity of money in the long run, but allow short-run monetary influence over Y. Whether changes in V over the short-run happened to also undo some of the changes in MT as an unintended side effect of this monetary policy is still an open question.
CONCLUSIONS
The long-running debate over the purported failure of the classical quantity theory of money in the colonial economy is shown to be a failure of data rather than a failure of theory.
Only Pennsylvania has enough high-quality data to support econometric testing. For this colony, when new data on the quantity of specie is added to the existing data on the quantity of paper money and estimated in short-and long-run monetary models, the purported failure of the classical quantity theory of money disappears. From 1729 through 1775, per capita total real money balances exhibited a stationary process with no trend. The backing theory of monetary performance, changes in MT undone by changes in V, is potentially relevant only during shortrun cyclical movements. The data on short-run movements in Y versus V, however, are insufficient to gage the magnitude or even the existence of such an effect in the colonial economy.
[Place Appendix-Tables A and B Here] (1978, p. 4) Using Only Mp for 1723-1774:
ln(PI (i) ) = 5.10 *** -0.02 ln(Mp (i) ) 0.00 --------(0.63) (0.07) ln(PI (i) ) = 4.31 *** -0.04 ln(Mp (i) ) + 0.09 ln(Mp (i-1) ) 0.05 --------(0.70) (0.06) (0.06) ln(PI (i) ) = 3.42 *** -0.02 ln(Mp (i) ) + 0.08 ln(Mp (i-1) ) + 0.06 ln(Mp (i-2) ) 0.13 -------- Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The R 2 s reported by West (1978, p. 4 ) are assumed to be Regression R 2 s. All results are AR2 error corrected for serial correlation. See
Appendix- Table A and text for variable definitions.
Sources: Appendix- Table A ; West (1978, pp. 2-5) . (1985b, p. 1,207) : b These interpolated values are reported in the brackets and their construction is described in the notes of Appendix- Table B .
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. When Total R 2 is reported this means that the results are AR1 error corrected for serial correlation. Par is defined as the percentage the exchange rate (e) is below the relevant redemption rate, where the redemption rate is 1.0
Maryland pound equals 0.75 pounds sterling and e is defined as the "sterling value of a Maryland pound note" (Smith, 1985b, p. 1,201 (1764) ) equals the value of the sinking fund as a percentage of its value in 1764 which was its terminal and maximum value. D equals one for the years indicated and zero otherwise. Forecasted Backing equals the percentage by which the actual sinking funds accumulated at a given date falls below the linear accumulation rate, from 1733 through 1764, needed to fulfill the promised redemption in 1764.
Sources: Appendix- Table B ; Brock (1975, pp. 104-05, 417-22) ; Smith (1985b) . Source: Appendix- This method assumes that the velocity of circulation of paper money (Vp) equals the velocity of circulation of specie (Vs). Thus, in the quantity theory of money formation (Fisher 1912) : Bezanson, et al. (1935, pp. 429, 433) . This price index is converted to the Average Current Commodity Price in PA Pounds by multiplying the index number by the summation of the 20 commodity prices for the base year, dividing this number by 100, dividing this number by 20 (the number of commodities), and then dividing this number by 20 (to convert shillings to pounds).
Sources:
The data on outstanding Pennsylvania pounds are taken from Brock (1975, pp. 82-83, 386-87; 1992, p. 113) ; the ratio of specie to paper currency from Grubb (2004) ; the Pennsylvania population from Historical Statistics (1975, part 2, p. 1,168) ; and commodity prices from Bezanson, et al. (1935, pp. 429, 433) .
Footnotes:
1 The modern protagonists in this debate have added little new or original to the arguments that were prevalent and well articulated among the colonists themselves, other than the translation of these arguments into modern pedagogy (for just a few of the many examples, see Archives of State of New Jersey, 1st series, vol. 5, pp. 120-22, 156-57; Davis 1964, vol. 4, 377-405; Ernst 1973, pp. 63-64; Marchione 1983, pp. 325-30 ; various editorials on money in the Maryland Gazette between 1780 and 1782 and in the Pennsylvania Gazette between 1739 and 1760; Newell 1998, pp. 130-31, 145-46, 214-35; Nussbaum 1957, p. 27; Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, vol. 6, pp. 4516-30; Perkins 1991; Webster 1969, pp. 139-61 McCallum 1992; Michener 1987; Smith 1985a Smith , 1985b Smith , 1988 Wicker 1985) . All of these studies, however, are non-econometric and provide no statistical testing, with the one exception noted in footnote 1. In addition, price data were not used, because reliable price data do not exist, for North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
Finally, none of these studies have information on the specie component of the yearly money supply.
3 Several reasons account for why my replication of West's (1978) model differs from his original results. West used the Bezanson (1935) price index as reproduced in Cole (1938 Enders (1995, pp. 221-23, 257, 419, 421) . 6 The variant of the quantity theorists' model that relies on merchants to maintain the fixed exchange rate between paper and specie right up to the point where all specie disappears from the colony (Michener 1987, p. 264 ) is inconsistent with rational expectations. Given an increase in the quantity of paper money by the legislature, merchants would revise their expected probability that the legislature might in the near future continue this practice and so drive the colony over the zero-specie threshold. Given this increased expected likelihood, merchants would begin to demand higher prices in paper money per unit of specie well before the zerospecie threshold was reached, and vice versa. A rational expectations mechanism of monetary adjustment by merchant arbitragers would lead to a variable exchange rate between paper and specie even when considerable specie was still in circulation in the colony. Thus, paper and specie would be less than perfect substitutes, and the door would be opened to changes in the quantity of paper money affecting prices even when specie was in circulation. 7 All reported correlation coefficients are statistically different from zero above the 0.02 significance level. 8 The colonial institutional setting is somewhat reminiscent of the system proposed by Friedman (1948) . It should be noted at this juncture that this institutional linking of V and MT is also not a violation of the general quantity theory of money (MT*V = P*Y) or the "equation of exchange"
as Fisher (1912) called it. The classical assumption that V is not a direct function of MT is derived from the particular monetary institutional settings of the 19th and early 20th centuries where MT is a function of a loosely regulated fractional-reserve private banking system (Fisher 1912 , Laidler 1987 . Most quantity theorists would agree that V not being a direct function of MT is neither a universal nor institutionally-invariant condition. Because the colonial economy had no banks, no fractional reserve banking, no demand or time deposits, no mints for coinage, no government bonds, and so forth, the colonial world was clearly different enough to warrant relaxing the classical assumption that V is not a direct function of MT. 9 In this period, Maryland occasionally issued a small number of additional bills of credit that were backed, as other colonies backed their bills, through future taxes and land mortgages, and not by a sinking fund whose current value was directly measurable. See Brock (1975, pp. 99-105, 412-28) . 10 Smith (1985b 10 Smith ( , pp. 1201 states that e denotes the sterling value of a Maryland pound note, that the redemption rate is four Maryland pounds for three pounds sterling, that Par = .75e -1, that Par is the percentage the exchange rate is above the relevant redemption rate, and that the exchange rate (Ex) is the number of Maryland pounds per 100 pounds sterling (Appendix- that Par is the percentage that e is below the relevant redemption rate. 11 The same results are found for all subsequent models estimated in Table 2 . In addition, the standard Chow Test cannot reject the absence of a structural break at 1748 (F-statistic = 2.28).
The Chow Test is only relevant when using the correctly specified data and variable construction, i.e., the last regression reported in Table 2 . Dickey-Fuller tests show that from 1735 through 1765 both Par and ln(Ex) are trend-stationary, and Perron (1989 Perron ( , pp. 1380 tests show a structural break in these trend-stationary processes at 1748. However, the same results are found when the break is modeled to be either in 1749, 1750, or 1743. These results are available from the author upon request, or the reader can replicate them directly using the data in Appendix- Table B . Finally, even if there were structural breaks in Par and ln(Ex) at 1748, it would be impossible to distinguish between whether such breaks were caused by Maryland's successful currency redemption or by the shock to real trade flows occasioned by the end of the War of the Austrian Succession. In conclusion, Smith's (1985b) On commission fees, see Price (1977) . 13 Inspection of the Maryland exchange rate data (McCusker 1978, pp. 202-03) indicates that substantial measurement error may be present. The yearly exchange rate in many cases is derived from only a single observation in a particular merchant account book, and said observations across years are derived from different merchants reporting at different times of the year.
14 For example, the Currency Acts of 1751 and 1764 imposed on the colonies by Parliament did not produce effective backing regime shifts in most colonies. These acts required that colonial paper money not be made legal tender and that future taxes be put in place to redeem said paper money in a timely fashion (Ernst 1973 , Wicker 1985 , Grubb 2003 . Most colonies, such as Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York, had been backing and redeeming their paper money with explicit future taxes long before these acts. The removal of paper money's legal tender status by these acts also did not produce an effective regime shift. Because colonial legislatures had and continued to accept their own paper money in payment of the taxes they imposed and land mortgages they held, their paper money had de facto legal tender status for public debts. This, in turn, served as an effective nominal anchor for its use as a tender for private debts.
